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Summary findings
Devarajan, Go, Schiff, and Suthiwart-Narueput  review  cartels could potentially yield a better outcome, they
the arguments for taxing exports, considering two cases:  have their own practical limitations and do not negate
one in which a country has market power in the export  the conclusion that a country with market power can
commodity, and one in which it does not. Among their  benefit from imposing an export tax at the margin.
conclusions:  But the same cannot be said for countries without
For a country with market power in the export  market power. In most small, open economies that do
commodity, there are strong analytical and practical  not have market power in export markets, taxing exports
arguments for an export tax. While the optimal level of  is harmful not only to exports but also to general
the export tax may depend on the strategic behavior of  economic welfare and growth. Export taxes generate
other exporting and importing countries, on such  serious economic distortions and disincentives and are a
practical issues as long-run market power, on whether  poor  instrument for encouraging higher-value-added
smuggling is present, or on general equilibrium effects,  activities. And in revenue generation, they are likely to
such factors do not reverse the fundamental desirability  be dominated by other tax instruments and should be
of export taxation for countries with market power. And  viewed as at best a transitional measure to be replaced as
while alternative instruments such as export quotas and  soon as tax administration improves.
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'Devarajan,  Go, and  Suthiwart-Narueput  are with  the  Policy  Research  Department;  Schiff  with  the International
Economics  DepartmentIntroduction
Export taxation  has a long and varied history. 2 England imposed export duties on wool and
hides as far back as 1275 and applied them to more than 200 articles by 1660. Most export duties
were however  eliminated in Europe in the 19th century, but a few were continued to encourage
domestic processing. In the United States, export duties were prohibited by the Constitution at the
insistence  of southern  states that produced agricultural  staples (e.g., cotton, tobacco, sugar, and rice)
for export. 3 After their declining  use in Europe, export duties were introduced in colonies in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America primarily to raise revenue. They were also used to favor exports to the
colonizing country and shipping in national-flag carriers through discriminatory  rates and rebates.
After World War II, implicit export taxes from the surpluses of export marketing boards
became  popular in many  newly-independent  developing  countries  in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 4
Export marketing  boards were at one point or another important in many other countries, including
Burma, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria,  Philippines, Thailand, and Uganda; they usually monopolized
the export of commodities such as cotton, groundnuts (peanuts), cocoa, coffee, coconut products,
palm kernels and palm oil, rice and sugar.  Stabilization funds are popular in francophone Africa.
Explicit export taxes are applied to a wide range of major tropical agricultural products including
2See,  for  example,  Levin  (1960)  and  Goode  (1984).
'With the advent  of the cotton  gin,  cotton  produced  by the southern  states accounted  for  more  than  half of U.S.
exports  from  1800  to 1860. See,  for example,  Willis  and  Primack  (1989).
4In its broadest  sense,  export  taxes  include  not  only  explicit  custom  duties  but also  implicit  taxes  from surpluses
of state  marketing  boards  and stabilization  funds,  and  profits  from  multiple  exchange  rate  systems.
1coffee, tea, sugar, bananas, rice, ground nuts, vegetable oils, rubber, jute,  sisal, logs, hides, tin,
copper, bauxite, and other commodities.
Today, a change  in circumstances  has led  to renewed interest in export taxation.  Two of the
more  common reforms undertaken by developing countries since the  1980s have been lower
protection  to import substitutes  and a depreciation  of the real exchange rate.  Both imply an increase
in the relative domestic price of exports.  As a result, several countries are asking whether these
exports should  be taxed.  Some commodity-exporting  countries fear that higher producer prices for
exports will result  in higher output, lower terms of trade and hence lower incomes.  This is commonly
referred  to  as the  "adding up"  problem.  From  1980-92, the World Bank's  index of non-oil
commodity prices fell by almost 50 percent.  The index for beverage crops (cocoa, coffee, tea) fell
by 60 percent.  By taxing exports, could any one of these countries prevent or mitigate the decline
in world commodity  prices? The answer depends crucially  on whether or not the country has market
power in the commodity.
Even when a country  has no market power in the commodity,  there is another reason for the
heightened  interest in export taxation: the potentially lucrative source of revenue now that domestic
(relative) export prices have risen. 5 How important are export taxes in the revenues of developing
countries?  Between 1970 and 1990, at least ten countries - five of which are shown in Table 1-
collected  more than 20 percent of their tax revenue from export duties in at least one year during the
period.  Nineteen countries collected between ten and twelve percent in one year during the same
'This argument  is sometimes  framed in terms of insulating domestic  producers from fluctuations  in export prices.
However, price stabilization schemes  have generally  resulted in the taxation of exports.
2period,  and twelve collected between five and ten percent.  The number of countries collecting
between one and five percent was 23, and several, mainly industrialized, countries collected none.
Regardless of its importance to government revenue, the decision  to tax exports should depend on
the distortionary cost - if any - imposed by the tax compared with alternative means of raising the
same revenue.
Table 1 - Countries with Export Taxes Greater than 20% of Government  Revenue
Country  Export taxes as share of revenues (%l)  Years
Burundi  26  1977-78
Sri Lanka  30  1978-79
Mexico  27  1982
Ethiopia  20  1977-78
Guinea  44  1988-90
Source: International  Monetary  Fund, Government Financial  Statistics
This paper-reviews the various arguments for taxing exports.  We consider two different
cases: (1) when the country has market power in the export commodity; and (2) when it does not.
In each case, we spell out the underlying analytical  foundation, then ask whether the practical
considerations involved are likely to reverse the analytical  findings. We conclude with some
simple rules for evaluating the desirability  of an export tax. While export taxes are typically levied
on agricultural as well as forest and mineral  products, we focus mainly on exports of agricultural
comnmodities  since the taxation of natural resources like forest and mineral products and the
related issues of Dutch disease require a separate and distinct treatment. 6
6See, for example, Corden and Neary (1982), Slade (1984, 1986) and Neary (1986).1.  COUNTRIES  WITH  MARKET  POWER
1.1  The Analytical Case for Export Taxes
The possession of market power by an exporting country with competitive producers
provides a strong analytical  case for an export tax (or export quota; on quotas, see below). 7 As
indicated in Bhagwati (1971), unexploited market power on the world market is a distortion from
the viewpoint of the exporting country. By levying an optimal export tax which targets this
distortion, a country with market power can improve its terms of trade and welfare. While there
are several possible interventions  which could improve the country's terms of trade, an export tax
is the preferred instrument on analytical  grounds because they precisely correct this underlying
distortion without inducing others.  A production tax in a country with market power, for
example, could also improve its terms of trade by lowering exports via curtailed production but
would be less efficient than export taxes.  A country with market power can improve its terms of
trade by reducing exports, which are the difference between domestic production and
consumption.  Since an export tax is equivalent  to a tax on domestic production and a subsidy on
domestic consumption, an export tax reduces exports by simultaneously  reducing production and
7 In general  equilibrium  models  of trade, it  does not make any sense  to distinguish between market power in export
v.  import  markets. A country  has market power if it faces an offer curve that is not a straight line. In theory, the optimal
tariff for such a country could be either an export tax or an import tariff since the two should  yield similar results due to
Lerner symmetry. Both have a similar impact on net import  demands and the marginal quantities  traded.
The above is only true if the export tax is on all exports and the import tax is on all imports.  Since the optimal
export tax only applies to commodities  with market power and not to all exports, there is no symmetry  between specific
commodity  export taxes and uniform tariffs. For more on this, see the section on general equilibrium  issues below.
4increasing consumption. By contrast, production taxes (or consumption subsidies) exploit only
one route for reducing exports. 8
In standard theory, this optimal or welfare-maximizing  export tax is given by the inverse
of the elasticity of demand. 9 Facing a less than perfectly elastic demand curve is theoretically
sufficient  to warrant a positive export tax.  Note that neither full monopoly power nor inelastic
demand is required. By contrast, a country with no market power faces an infinitely  elastic
demand curve and has an optimal tax of zero.  Intuition for the above result can be gained by
thinking of the analogy with firms. Price exceeds marginal revenue for firms which face a
downward-sloping demand curve. They can therefore increase profits by restricting output below
the level where price equals marginal cost.10 Similarly,  an optimal export tax restricts the exports
of competitive producers to a level which maximizes  national welfare.
While the welfare of the producer country would be increased by such a tax, consuming
countries will lose more than the producing countries gain and world welfare will fall. It would be
better for all concerned if the producing countries pursued a free trade policy and the consuming
countries compensated the producing countries for their losses with lump-sum transfers.  Why
does this not happen?  A basic problem is credibility. Under free trade, the world price would be
'More formally,  individual  country  optimality  requires  that  the domestic rate of transformation  (DRT), the domestic
rate of substitution  (DRS), and the foreign rate of transformation  (FRT, or the slope of the foreign offer curve) be equated.
However,  in the large  country  case,  the FRT is  no longer  equal  to the ratio of world prices.  An optimal (export) tariff breaks
the equality between domestic prices (DP) and world prices (WP) in such a way that DRS=DRT=DP=FRTtWP.  By
contrast,  however,  a production tax induces additional  distortions by destroying the equality between DRS and DRT.  See
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1984).
9For instance, if the export demand elasticity  were - 20, the optimal export tax rate would be 5 percent.  To be
precise,  these  are offer or relative  demand  curve elasticities since  we are dealing with general equilibrium. Also, we ignore
other distortions in that economy.
'"Again, note that this is also true in an oligopoly or monopolistically  competitive setup. Full monopoly  is not
required.
5lower but the producer price would be higher than under export restrictions.  The higher producer
price would stimulate investment and output in the long run.  Once these investments were made,
the consuming countries could stop compensating  the producing countries.  Thus, producing
countries may prefer to exercise control over the income transfer by implementing trade
restrictions." 
The above considered the case for an export tax in the absence of any strategic
considerations. How is the above prescription changed once strategic considerations are
incorporated?  In what follows, we consider the implications of strategic behaviour on the part of
domestic exporters; other exporting countries; and by importing countries (i.e., trading partners).
We argue that a country with market power should benefit from imposing an export tax,
regardless of the behavior of other exporting or importing countries.  The latter affects the
optimal level of the export tax, but not its basic desirability.
If domestic exporting firms perceive their collective  market power and privately
coordinate exports, then there is no need for government intervention by way of an export tax.'2
This is likelier when there are relatively few domestic exporters which facilitates collusion.  13
Encouraging such private coordination in lieu of an export tax, however, is no panacea.  An
" This is the outcome  of a strategic game  between producing and consuming  countries in the case of hysteresis or
irreversibility of investment  decisions. If producing countries  could increase or decrease investment and output with no
adjustment cost, then lump-sum  transfers from consuming  countries  would be acceptable to producing countries.  For a
discussion  of hysteresis, see Pindyck (1988, 1994),  Dixit (1989, 1992), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
12 See Bhagwati,  J. N. and T. N. Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade. Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1984, p.
178.
"Sustaining  a collusive  outcome  requires  that  individual  deviations  (i.e.,  exporting more than the agreed upon level)
be readily detectable and punishable.  Both are likelier when there are fewer firms and where each firm's  output is
identifiable.  Sustaining  a collusive  outcome is less likely  when there are many firms and the product is homogeneous. The
output externality refers to the fact that an individual  exporting firm does not take into account the negative effect that
increasing its exports has on other  exporting firms via a reduction in export price.
6industry which colludes and exercises monopoly power when exporting is also likely to do so
when buying or selling domestically,  leading to domestic distortions. Furthermore, production of
most non-mineral  conmmodities  in developing countries is done by large numbers of small-scale
producers (farmers), with prohibitive  transaction and monitoring costs of collusion, unless exports
are carried out by a few colluding firms or by a marketing board (see below).
Suppose such domestic coordination is not forthcoming and the government considers
imposing an export tax. How should the behavior of fellow exporting countries affect the
government's decision? If the other exporting countries are small and have no market power,
then they are unlikely to have an export tax.  Nonetheless, they are likely to benefit from
improved terms of trade and increase exports after the large country imposes an export tax.
Although it does not fully appropriate all the benefits of restricting exports, the large country is
still likely to benefit from having an export tax." 4
If the other exporting countries are large, they may also impose an export tax.  If the
exporting countries do not collude, each individual  country ignores the positive benefit that
raising export taxes and restricting exports has on other countries. It is then likely that in
equilibrium  the individual export taxes will be too low from the standpoint of collective exporter
welfare.' 5 Coordination among the exporting countries would raise their collective welfare.
However, as discussed further below, this may not be feasible in practice.  Alternatively, exporting
"Unless the supply elasticity of the other countries is so large that it wipes out any terms of trade improvement
induced by the export tax. Since the other countries  are "small" by assumption, this is not likely to happen.
'5For instance, this would be the case under a Nash strategy,  where each country  sets its export tax in order to
maximize welfare taking the other countries' export tax as given.
7countries may behave non-cooperatively but may choose to maximize government revenue rather
than welfare." 6 In this case, both export taxes and welfare are likely to be higher in equilibrium.  17
Does the importing country's response alter the desirability of an export tax?  If the
importing country is large, it may also impose an optimal tariff in retaliation to the export tax.18
In equilibrium, it can be shown that the exporting country can still be better off than under free
trade despite such retaliation.' 9 Tariff retaliation therefore does not necessarily undo the case for
an optimal export tax. 20 Note that for products such as coffee and cocoa, retaliation by importing
countries is unlikely. On the contrary, the latter have supported export restrictions by the
producing countries through arrangements such as the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and
the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO).
In sum, the key analytical  point remains: a country with market power can benefit from
imposing an export tax, regardless of the behavior of other exporting or importing countries.
" 6For  instance,  a number  of commodity  exporting  countries  have  a thin  tax base  and  may  choose  export  taxes  in
order  to  maximize  government  revenue.  There  are other  reasons  why  a country  might  charge  revenue-maximizing  export
taxes. Many  exporting  countries  are characterized  by a large  number  of small  producers  with  exports  controlled  by a
parastatal  marketing  board  (or by a few  colluding  exporters).  In that  case,  the private  or public  exporter(s)  may  act as a
monopsonist  with  respect to the producers  and  as a monopolist  with  respect  to the world  market. If the objective  is to
maximize  profits,  then  the entity  behaves  as if it is a revenue-maximizer.
"Panagariya  and  Schiff(I  994)  show  that  Nash  revenue-maximizing  taxes  are  higher  than Nash  welfare-maximizing
taxes  for  each  exporting  country.  They  also  show  that  if  Nash  taxes  are chosen  to maximize  government  revenue,  they  are
likely  to  generate  higher  welfare  than  Nash  welfare-maximizing  taxes. Welfare-maximizing  Nash  taxes  are smaller  than the
cooperative  (monopoly)  taxes  which  maximize  welfare  for the producing  countries  as a whole. Since  revenue-maximizing
Nash  taxes  are larger  than  welfare-maximizing  Nash  taxes,  there  is a possibility  that  the producing  countries  will  be closer
to the cooperative  tax level  and that  they  will  result  in  higher  profits. In simulations  with  a model  for  cocoa  (Panagariya
and  Schiff,  1995),  they  found  that  welfare  is higher  in each  of the nine  producing  countries  under  revenue-maximizing  Nash
taxes  (85%  higher  on  average).  By  levying  the higher  revenue-maximizing  export  taxes,  producing  countries  can increase
revenue  as well  as welfare.  This  result  does  not hold  under  cooperative  (collusive)  behavior  by the exporting  countries.
"8Recall  that  this  retaliatory  tax can be either  an import  or export  tax  per Lerner  synmmetry.
'9SeeJohnson,HL  G. "Optimum  Tariffs  and  Retaliatiom"  Review  of Economic  Studies  21,  no. 55 (1953-54):  152-
53.
20This  is because  the game-theoretic  equilibriurn  will occur  in the area formed  by the intersection  of the two
countries'  free trade  offer  curves.
8The latter can affect the level of the optimal export tax, but not its basic desirability. However,
practical considerations may affect this analytical  conclusion, an issue we turn to next.
1.2  The Practical Case for Export Taxes
While countries with market power have a strong analytical case for export taxes, we
consider whether and how practical considerations may affect this finding. We argue that even
when evaluated from a practical standpoint, export taxes remain preferable to alternative means of
restricting exports such as quotas, cartels, or marketing boards. 2'  Implementing the export tax
also requires taking into account (1) long-run demand and supply elasticities; (2) the likelihood of
smuggling; and (3) general equilibrium  effects. While these are important practical considerations
which may affect the optimal level of the export tax, they do not reverse the case for its basic
desirability.
Alternative Instruments
Under certain circumstances, an export quota is equivalent to an export tax for a single
exporting country. 22 In their modern incarnation, export quotas include voluntary export
restraints (VERs), which have been applied on such diverse goods as automobiles from Japan and
textiles and apparel from developing countries.
2 "Recall that  we have already  established  in the preceding  section  that on analytical  grounds,  export  taxes are
preferred  over  other  instruments  such  as  production  taxes.
22However,  in  the case  of more  than  one  large  exporting  country,  Panagariya  and  Schiff(l  992)  have  shown  that
a symmetric  Nash equilibrium  with export quotas  is likely  to be more restrictive  and yield  higher welfare  than the
equilibrium  with  export  taxes. These  results  are also  supported  by simulations  for  the cocoa  market. Welfare  was  found
to  be 30% higher  on average  in all producing  countries  in the case  of export  quotas  and government  revenue  -- assuming
the quotas  are auctioned  --150%  higher  on average  in each  country.
9However, relative to export taxes, there are several practical problems involved with
export quotas.  First, the quota has to be allocated to the various producers and most allocation
mechanisms have generally led to inefficiencies. Unless the quota is auctioned or a secondary
market for the quota exists, the allocation will be inefficient  in the sense that not all producers
who obtain a quota share will be among the most efficient producers (marginal production costs
will not be equalized across producers).  Second, additional resources will be wasted in rent-
seeking activities devoted to capturing quota rights. Third, export quotas are likely to be less
efficient than export taxes in a world of fluctuating market conditions (which characterize many
commodity markets) since the latter allow for a supply response while the former, by definition,
do not.
A cartel will maximize welfare for the cartel as a whole by charging the cooperative or
monopoly export tax.  In theory, this would be the optimal solution for the producing countries.
In practice, large cartel (or monopoly) profits may be elusive.  First, the cooperative export tax
set by a cartel is larger than the export taxes that the exporting countries would each set
individually.'  If producing countries are similar in production conditions, they will agree to levy
the larger cooperative tax.  But if the countries differ significantly  in production conditions, some
countries may refuse to go along because their output and exports will fall significantly  (or
entirely) and they may lose.  In theory, a compensation system could be set up.  In practice this
may not be feasible due to the credibility  problem discussed earlier. 24 Consequently, export
2 "This compares  the single  period  Nash  outcome  with  the single  period  collusive  outcome.  It is also  possible  to
sustain  a collusive  (Nash)  outcome  without  a  formal  cartel  arrangement  in a repeated  game  setting.
24A  country  which  lowers  production  of,  say,  coffee  (or  copper)  will see  its stock  of trees (or  its mines)  deteriorate
over  time,  and  will  thus  lose  its bargaining  power  to ensure  that  compensation  continues  at the same  level (or  at all).
10reductions of the member countries are often allocated according to a different rule (e.g., in an
equiproportionate manner). Hence, the export quotas determined by the cartel are not optimal in
the sense of equating marginal  production costs across member countries, and cartel profits will
be lower than those obtained by a pure monopoly.
Second, as in every cartel, each member has an incentive to cheat (free ride) and sell more
than its quota at a price close to the high cartel price.  Such cheating has often led to the
temporary or permanent demise of cartels.
Third, supply shocks may destabilize cartels.  Even though OPEC has been a remarkably
successful cartel, commodities such as coffee, cocoa and tea are different from oil. The output of
oil is essentially  controllable and predictable since it can easily be stored simply  by not extracting
it and leaving it in the ground.  This is not the case with coffee, cocoa and tea, where significant
annual output variation may result in severe disagreements on the size of the export quotas.  For
instance, a country experiencing a significant  increase in output due to favorable climatic
conditions may demand a higher export quota, especially since storage costs are high.  If such an
output increase is permanent, then the pressure to obtain a higher quota will be even larger.
Fourth, demand shocks may destabilize cartels as well. For instance, what triggered the
collapse of the ICA (the International Coffee Agreement) was the increase in the price of Arabica
relative to that of Robusta (maybe due to the secular income increase).  This led the ICA to try,
unsuccessfully,  to lower Brazil's quota (Brazil being a major producer of Robusta).
In sum, a cartel is an unstable institution because of the incentive to cheat and because
demand and supply shocks can destabilize it.  It should be noted that cartels such as the ICA have
11collapsed despite support by the consuming countries. Given the political interests of the EU in
Africa and of the U.S. in Latin America, the EU and the U.S. supported the ICA (International
Coffee Agreement) and the ICCO (International Cocoa Organization) until their collapse. 25
A monopoly export marketing board or parastatal can coordinate domestic producers
and charge the optimal export tax (by paying producers less than the export price).  However, if
the marketing board tries to maximize its revenues, it will exercise monopsony power over
producers as well which would be a source of inefficiency. 26
Other problems with marketing boards relate to political-economy  issues. These boards
may be used for patronage, whereby the authorities give cushy jobs to important political players
in exchange for their loyalty. Moreover, the boards are often run inefficiently,  with a bloated
labor force and no pressure to make profits. Rather than being a source of revenue, they become
a sink. The population obtains little or no benefit from the implicit export tax while producers are
heavily taxed.  One example is Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board which, in the early 1980s, had
about 100,000 employees.
Second, there is often a lack of transparency in the accounts of these boards.  Strong
suspicions exist that, for many of them, not all the revenues (over and above the bloated costs)
find their way to the general budget.  Third, the pricing rules of the boards often eliminate private
sector activity. By setting constant prices regardless of geographical location or time of year,
25Recently,  ICA has been re-established  in some form by Colombia, with the support of Brazil and others, with
some success.
26Unless  producing  countries  exhibited  Nash behavior, in which case, export taxes above the welfare-maximizing
Nash taxes are likely to raise welfare.
12marketing boards reduce the incentive for the private sector to invest in transportatirn  or sto a.we
and often lead to inefficient  production location decisions.
Implementation Issues
Determining the appropriate level of the export tax requires taking into account long-run
demand and supply elasticities; smuggling;  and general equilibrium  effects. We consider each in
turn.
Properly estimating the degree of market power requires producing countries not to
underestimate the ability of consumers and of existing and potential suppliers to respond to long
run price changes. For instance, the response of both consumers and producers to the creation of
OPEC has been considerable (with energy conservation, shift to other sources of energy, and new
sources of oil supply). OPEC's policy has led it to lose market share and power over time.
Nevertheless, the members of OPEC certainly gained from forming the cartel (in terms of present
value of income or wealth). Thus, pursuing a policy which results in a gradual loss of market
power may be optimal. The problem occurs when that gradual loss is larger than expected so that
export taxes are set too high relative to the optimum.
In the case of cocoa, the fall in Ghana's output due to its highly overvalued currency in the
early 1980s led to a significant  output response in Cote d'Ivoire and Brazil as well as among  such
recent entrants as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Oceania. With lower prices in recent years, Cote
d'Ivoire, Brazil and Malaysia have reduced output.  This suggests that the elasticity of excess-
demand for cocoa facing individual  producing countries is quite large and their market power may
13have been overestimated. In a simulation  of the cocoa market, Panagariya and Schiff (1990)
calculated long-run (steady-state Nash) welfare-maximizing  taxes assuming large supply
elasticities (a value of 3.0) for newcomers Malaysia, Indonesia and Oceania.  The optimal Nash
export tax was small for these three countries but not for the traditional producers with lower
supply elasticities. The tax was 25% for Cote d'Ivoire, 20% for Ghana and 15% for Brazil.2 7
These taxes raised average welfare in the cocoa sector of producing countries by 23% relative to
free trade. 28
The possibility  of smuggling  imposes additional constraints on the level of the export tax.
As with any tax, excessively high rates lead to evasion.  The export tax rate should be lower than
the cost of smuggling. If neighbouring countries also have export taxes, then the difference in tax
rates must be lower than the cost of smuggling. Otherwise, the high-tax country will lose its tax
base.  For instance, in the early 1980s, significant  amounts of cocoa were smuggled from Ghana
to Cote d'Ivoire due to the enormous tax caused by Ghana's highly overvalued currency and the
low cost of smuggling,  as cocoa is produced in an area that spans both sides of the border.
General equilibrium  considerations are also important in setting the level of the optimal
export tax.  According to the Lerner (1936) symmetry  result in international trade, we know that
under a fixed trade balance an import tax is equivalent to an export tax. An export tax subsidizes
domestic consumption and taxes domestic production of exportables, while an import tariff
"It  should be noted that these optimal taxes are smaller than the tax which would have been obtained from
maximizing  the present value of welfare rather than steady-state  welfare.
28As noted before, if the countries  maximized tax revenue, then Nash taxes would be significantly  higher still.
Under revenue maximization,  welfare was 125% higher on average compared to free trade and 83% higher than under
optimal taxes.
14subsidizes domestic production and taxes domestic consumption of importables. Both therefore
have a similar impact on net import demands.
Industrial protection therefore results in a tax on exports, which must be taken into
account when designing  trade policy for commodity exports.  Import liberalization raises the price
of exportables relative to importables and nontradables (because of real exchange rate
depreciation) and leads to higher exports, including commodity exports.  Hence, optimal explicit
export taxes will be higher when import taxes are reduced.  Of course, it is preferable to have
lower import taxes and a higher commodity  export tax than the opposite because import taxes
distort relative prices by taxing all exports as well as nontradables. 29 This issue is further
examined  in the Appendix (See Fallacy 1). The appendix also examines the issue of the optimal
export tax when the goods subject to the tax are also consumed in large quantities in the
producing countries (see Fallacy 2).
In sum, implementation  issues are not likely to reverse the case for explicit export taxes.
Export taxes are relatively simple to administer, dominate other policy instruments, and raise
producing countries' welfare. 30 While  practical issues such as long-run market power,
smuggling, and general equilibrium considerations may affect the optimal level of the export tax,
they do not reverse their  fundamental desirability  for countries with market power. 31 However,
29This  issue is examined  in more detail in Schiff (1995).
30Though  welfare-maximizing  Nash export quotas are likely to generate  higher profits than welfare-maxiumizing
Nash export taxes, the formner  suffer from potentially severe and costly implementation  problems. Revenue-maximizing
Nash taxes are likely to raise welfare above welfare-maximizing  Nash export taxes as well, but without generating
implementation  problems. Being equilibrium  taxes, Nash taxes do not suffer  from the sustainability  problem cartels face.
"The first two considerations  imply  lower  export  taxes, while liberalization  of imports implies higher export taxes.
15the same can certainly not be said for export taxation by countries without market power, which
we consider next.
2.  COUNTRIES  WITHOUT  MARKET  POWER
2.1  The Analytical Case for Export Taxes
According to the theory of optimal commodity  taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971),
there should be no distortionary taxes on production.  To allow for efficient  production, revenue
should be raised through taxes on consumption. Clearly,  this theory does not favor export taxes,
which would be distortionary for countries without market power.
Hence, in most small, open economies where market power in export markets is non-
existent, taxing exports is a bad idea, harmful not only to exports but economic welfare and
growth. Conventional economic wisdom places a high premium on market-friendly policies and
non-distortionary taxes that foster, for example, a neutral trade or investment regime.
Furthermore, superior export performance, generally  viewed as an outcome of economic and
trade liberalization, is linked with rapid economic growth, particularly in high-performing East
Asian countries. 32 The standard arguments in trade reform that often call for lower trade
protection or zero import tariffs are easily extended to no export taxes (Lerner 1936). Finally, the
design of a consumption tax, such as the value-added tax (VAT), invariably  recommends that
exports are zero-rated.
3See, among  others,  Balassa  (1978)  and  Pack  (1988).  In fact,  liberal  fiscal  incentives,  rather  than  export taxation,
are generally  associated  with  export  activities  in  most  high-performing  East  Asian  countries  (see World  Bank-,  1993).
16Yet, export taxes persist in countries without market power.  As with other inefficient
taxes, export taxes have been tolerated or even recommended under special circumstances. 33 It is
sometimes argued that special circumstances  in developing countries do not fit the assumptions of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) which requires, for example, that all goods be taxable and that
profits can be taxed completely or that profitable sectors are publicly owned. 3  It is easy to see
how these assumptions may not hold in developing countries. For example, there exist large
informal and agricultural sectors where transactions are hard to tax (in goods or factor markets).
A fixed factor like land, which is supplied  inelastically,  receives profits or rents (e.g., in
agricultural production) and it may not be possible or desirable that all land be owned publicly so
that land rents accrue only to the government.
2.2  The Practical Case for Export Taxes
Are there practical considerations which would reverse the above analytical  finding and
warrant developing countries without market power to engage in export taxation? Without going
into the details of the theory of taxation for developing countries, 35 this section reviews the major
arguments for and against export taxation in these economies, including (1) the encouragement
of higher value-added activities; and (2) the difficulty  of implementing  alternative taxes; and (3)
the desirability  of windfall  taxes.  We conclude, however, that export taxes are dominated by
other policy instruments and should at best be viewed as a transitional measure.
"To cite a few  sources,  see  Goode  (1984),  Andic,  Andic,  and  de Alonzo  (1990),  and G6mez-Sabaini  (1990).
3'See,  for  example,  Newbery  (1987). Alternatively,  the Diamond  and  Mirrlees  (1971)  model  requires  production
under  constant  returns  to scale  with  zero  economnic  profits  if  profits  cannot  be completely  taxed.
3 "See Newbery  and  Stern  (1987).
17Encouraging Higher Value Added
Export taxes have been used as an indirect form of protection (G6mez-Sabaini 1990). By
taxing primary exports, proponents hope to encourage production and export of higher value
added goods through the dampening effects on domestic prices, which act as indirect subsidies to
the next stage of processing (e.g., export taxes on rawhide to encourage export of leather in
Argentina). It is also argued that export taxation will improve export quality when applied to low
quality products (e.g., unwashed wool).
The protection argument, whether through import or export taxes, is generally discredited.
From the standpoint of efficiency,  there are other interventions and instruments available (such as
direct subsidies to the activity to be encouraged) which are less distortionary if the goal is to
encourage particular activities. However, in the absence of any compelling source of market
failure, this begs the question of why these particular activities should be encouraged in the first
place.  Furthermore, even if such a market failure should be identified,  the preferred  policy
intervention would be to target that particular distortion directly. Many  arguments for
encouraging higher value added typically  rely on some form of credit market failure for their
justification.  In this case, addressing such credit market failures directly would be a superior
policy intervention to instituting export taxes.
Aside from efficiency  losses, encouraging higher value added through export taxation
could be highly  inequitable in practice.  Often, the primary producers in question are many and
the potential beneficiaries at the next stage of processing are few.  (Indeed, if the reverse were
18true, then there is no obvious reason why processing would need to be further encouraged. 36)
Finally, if entry to the manufacturing stage is regulated, it may lead to oligopolistic practices,
which should be avoided.
Revenue Generation: ne  Difficulty of Implementing Alternative Taxes
Export taxes on primary goods are generally  used as a means of taxing agriculture and
rural producers.  In general, developing countries with poor tax administrations find in primary
exports a significant  taxable base that can easily be exploited. Export taxes have obvious
administrative advantages for taxing the income of numerous small farmers who are otherwise
difficult  to reach through income or land taxes.  Indeed, every tax, with its own informational
requirements, is incomplete unless the administrative  factors are included (Stem 1982, Besley
1989, and Slemrod 1990). The best argument for export taxes is that they economize on
information because they are more easily monitored.  Taxes on output may require knowledge of
marketed sales of numerous farmers. In addition, income taxes will require information on
production costs, wages, and profits as well. Land taxes, to be equitable, must vary with land
quality as well as acreage.  The difficulty  of assessing land values in rural areas of developing
" 6If there is an equity case for export taxes, this should  be weighed against the efficiency  cost of the distortions
induced as well as against alternative  means of addressing  equity considerations  (e.g., through other tax and expenditure
policy).
19countries makes land taxes even less implementable." In such a situation, export taxation is an
attractive substitute.8
Collection issues and revenue needs make export taxation of agricultural commodities
seem compelling. At best, however, it should be looked at-as a temporary and transitional
measure, to be replaced immediately  as tax administration  improves (Linn 1990). As a substitute
tax, there are many problems associated with it: (1) it creates an incentive to produce that part of
agriculture which is not exported; (2) even if output is entirely exported, it is a good substitute for
a land tax only if supply is completely  inelastic, which is often not the case, e.g., because of
possible crop substitution; (3) if crop substitution leads to less labor- intensive activities, then
rural laborers may be significantly  worse off with a fall in wages or rise in unemployment; and, (4)
a fall in rural wages in turn may increase rural-to-urban migration and urban unemployment and
may depress urban wages as well.
In some cases, equity considerations may also be important if land ownership in
agriculture is heavily concentrated in a privileged few and export taxation is the only reliable
means to taxing them. In such situations, the benefits of taxing rent incomes of the few through
"The land tax,  despite  its efficiency  in theory, has several drawbacks.  Hoff (1991) argued that while the intake of
an output  tax can vary depending  whether the harvest is above or below average, land taxation (which is normally not tied
or indexed to output) increases the riskiness of net farmer income given imperfect risk markets in rural areas.  Skinner
(1991)  also found,  in addition  to (i) the increase  in income  risks, that ( ii) capitalization  effects of the land tax impose a large
burden  on the current generation;  and(iii) administration  of the land tax entails costly informational  requirements. The last
was found  as the best explanation  of the  weak link  between  theoretical  and practical aspects of land taxation. Note that some
of the above drawbacks apply equally to export taxes.  Similarly  to (ii), export taxes also  generate capitalization effects
through lower producer prices.
'Also, in some  countries  (e.g., Argentina),  a land tax was seen as expropriation and resisted, while an export tax
was not and therefore acceptable.
20export taxes must be judged against the various costs cited above. Furthermore, if these
households are so few, it should be easy to identify and tax them directly.
Windfall Taxes
Some countries (e.g., Argentina and the Philippines  in several occasions) taxed  their
primary exports during a commodity price boom in the world markets or when there was a
substantial devaluation of the foreign exchange rate taking place in the economy as a way for the
government to partake in the temporary economic  windfall. Such a windfall tax functions as a
substitute tax in the absence of a well-functioning  direct income tax on agriculture. The same
arguments cited in the preceding section apply to the windfall tax.  Taxing exports is also used as
a means of making a devaluation politically  more acceptable (particularly in the presence of
import-substituting industries and if exportables are an important part of the consumption basket.)
However, arguments calling for a windfall  tax on exports should also allow for a compensating
export subsidy  when the exchange rate is overvalued (e.g., during the period prior to the
devaluation). Since no subsidy  is usually given when the currency is overvalued, no windfall tax
should apply after devaluation. Moreover, the new literature on irreversibility and investment
under uncertainty also calls attention to the observation that profits sometimes need to reach a
threshold much beyond the restoration of an old level before investment will again take place (i.e.,
hysteresis). 39 Hence, under risky conditions, when export prices are volatile in the world markets,
a windfall  tax during a price boom or devaluation may be just the wrong policy.
3 9See,  for examples, Pindyck  (1988, 1994), Dixit (1989, 1992), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
21There is a related argument which stems from the fact that world prices for many
commodities fluctuate.  Farrners in developing countries may not be able to diversify  their risk
whereas governments are in a better position to do so.  A tax-cum-subsidy scheme which
eliminates the price risk to farmers (and transfers it all to the government) may therefore be
welfare-improving. However, this argument too needs to be treated with caution. First, to be
welfare-improving,  the policy must be a tax during high prices and a subsidy during low prices.
As noted earlier, the latter has rarely occurred. Price stabilization  schemes have typically
depressed producer prices below world prices. Second, that governments are better able to
diversify  risk than private producers is a questionable assumption. While in principle,
governments have access to a wider array of risk-spreading instruments, in practice they
frequently do not optimize across these instruments.4' As a result, the government is also highly
exposed to commodity price shocks -- which is why they are reluctant to pay out subsidies during
periods of low world prices.
3.  CONCLUSION:  A SUMMARY  CHECKLIST  FOR  EVALUATING  AN  ExPORT  TAX
Export taxation has a long history. It is enjoying  renewed interest among developing
countries because recent reforms have raised the relative domestic price of exports by lowering
import protection and depreciating the real exchange rate.  As a result, several countries are
asking whether these exports should be taxed.  Such a relative price increase, however, is not
'Note  that  because  the government  collects  taxes  from  a variety  of sectors  which  are imperfectly  correlated,  it is
likely  to  be in  a better  position  to absorb  risk. However,  this applies  generically  to  virtually  any  comparison  of private  and
public  risk-bearing.
22adequate grounds for imposing an export tax.  We conclude with a summary checklist for
evaluating the case for an export tax.  The single, most critical question is:
Does the country have market power in the export commodity?
If not, then there is unlikely to be a compelling analytical or practical case  for an export
tax. From both an efficiency  and equity standpoint, export taxes are a poor instrument for
encouraging higher value-added activities. From the standpoint of revenue generation,
they are likely to be dominated by other tax instruments and should at best be viewed as a
transitional measure.
If so, then there is likely to be a strong analytical andpractical  case for  an export tax.
Both strategic (i.e., the likely response of fellow exporters and importers) and practical
(e.g., long-run elasticities, smuggling,  and general equilibrium)  considerations affect the
level of the optimal export tax, but are unlikely to reverse the case for their basic
desirability. 41 Similarly,  the possibility  that alternative forms of intervention (e.g., export
quotas or cartels) might yield a superior outcome under certain circumstances does not
negate the finding  that national welfare would be improved by the imposition of some
export tax at the margin. 42
4 "Except  in the  particular  case where domestic  producers  collectively  perceive and have internalized the externality
associated  with the market power.
42Moreover,  as shown  earlier,  other  forms  of intervention suffer from a number of implementation  problems which
are not present in the case of export  taxes.
23Appendix:  Some Fallacies Related to Export Taxes
Fallacy 1
Structural  adjustment  policies work against export taxes by exacerbating the "adding-
up " problem and should therefore not be pursued in countries with market power.
The fact that structural adjustment implemented  in a number of countries will lead to
higher  relative  export prices,  to an expansion  of commodity  output, and to a fall in the terms
of trade of these countries,  does not imply  that structural adjustment policies (SAPs) should
not  be pursued.  On the contrary, second-best theory teaches that distortions should be
attacked at the source.  In this case, it implies that domestic policy instruments should be
used  to  correct domestic distortions and trade policy instruments such as export taxes
should  be used to deal with issues such as market power on the world market (Panagariya
and Schiff 1990). As indicated  by Bhagwati (1971),  unexploited  market power on the world
market is a distortion from the viewpoint of the producing countries.  Thus, SAPs should
be pursued -including  macroeconomic stabilization  and trade and domestic liberalization -
and  optimal export taxes should be levied on commodity exports where market power
prevails. Optimal export taxes following  the SAP will be larger than  in the absence of an
SAP.
Fallacy 2
If  the goods subject to an export tax are also consumed in large quantities in the
producing  countries, then the optimum export tax is lower because such a tax lowers
consumer welfare in the producing countries.
Unlike production taxes which also distort domestic prices, export taxes are a policy
instrument  which precisely targets  the particular distortion of  export market  power.
Consumer  welfare  in the producing  country  is therefore  not hurt by the imposition of export
taxes.  Indeed, domestic consumers gain from the export tax because it is equivalent to a
subsidy  on domestic  consumption  combined with a tax on domestic production. Of course,
consumers in other countries will be hurt by the higher world price induced by the export
tax. If our objective were to maximize the welfare of the developing countries as a whole
(including  consumers  in other developing countries), then the optimal export tax would be
lower.
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